10925, 26 Fed. Id. Identify the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that is most relevant They constitute but one part of plans that depend primarily upon other, nonracial elements. in No. As for the Seattle case, the school district has gone further in describing the methods and criteria used to determine assignment decisions on the basis of individual racial classifications. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 You already receive all suggested Justia Opinion Summary Newsletters. [B]enign carries with it no independent meaning, but reflects only acceptance of the current generations conclusion that a politically acceptable burden, imposed on particular citizens on the basis of race, is reasonable. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U. S., at 609610 (OConnor, J., dissenting). Losing the Dream?, p. 30, fig. See id., at 12, 2930. PICS cites previous Court cases holding that when a means used does not actually address all the harm it purports to address, it cannot be a compelling interest. Here, in contrast, the schools worked backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits. There seems to be no principled rule, moreover, to limit the dissents rationale to the context of public schools. We rely, as did the lower courts, largely on data from the 20002001 school year in evaluating the plan. ents in No. Moreover, there is research-based evidence supporting, for example, that a ratio no greater than 50% minoritywhich is Louisvilles starting point, and as close as feasible to Seattles starting pointis helpful in limiting the risk of white flight. See Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan Society, in Pursuit of a Dream Deferred: Linking Housing and Education Policy 121, 125. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees on Reargument in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1953, No. And it is for them to decide, to quote the pluralitys slogan, whether the best way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race. Ante, at 4041. Bd. If we look at cases decided during the interim between Brown and Adarand, we can see how a rigid adherence to tiers of scrutiny obscures Browns clear message. In administering public schools, it is permissible to consider the schools racial makeup and adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is its racial composition. In these cases two school districts in different parts of the country seek to teach that principle by having classrooms that reflect the racial makeup of the surrounding community. 2d 1224, 1240 (WD Wash. 2001) (Parents Involved I). Our cases recognized a fundamental difference between those school districts that had engaged in de jure segregation and those whose segregation was the result of other factors. B to Roe Affidavit in Seattle School Dist. 05915, pp. Whether or not the Court chooses to afford similar deference to public secondary schools will shape the control school districts have over their own policies. See Brief for Respondent at 3132. When litigation, as here, involves a complex, comprehensive plan that contains multiple strategies for achieving racially integrated schools, Brief for Respondents in No. At some point, the discrete injury will be remedied, and the school district will be declared unitary. Examples of these norms include defining white skin tones as nude or flesh colored, having a future time orientation, emphasizing individualism as opposed to a more collective ideology, defining one form of English as standard . That plan, which took effect before 1996, is the very plan that in all relevant respects is in effect now and is the subject of the present challenge. 1" and "Meredith" v. "Jefferson County Board of Education" cases, therefore, significantly . In Seattle, then, the benefits of racial diversity require enrollment of at least 31 percent white students; in Jefferson County, at least 50 percent. Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d, at 1192. The Current Plan: Project Renaissance Modified, 1996 to 2003. Assessed in any objective manner, there is no comparison between the two. The passage Justice Stevens quotes proves our point; all the quoted language says is that the school committee shall prepare a plan to eliminate the imbalance. Id., at 695, 227 N.E. 2d, at 731; see post, at 4, n. 5. of Boston v. Board of Ed., 352 Mass. 2d 753, 762764 (WD Ky. 1999). Pp. Perhaps the best example is provided by our approval of the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1967 upholding a state statute mandating racial integration in that States school system. See App. But the Seattle schools had never been segregated by law; and the Kentucky schools, though previously segregated by law, had their desegregation decree dissolved by a District Court in 2000 on the finding the school district had "eliminated the vestiges associated with the former policy of segregation and its pernicious effects". The statement by Justice Harlan that [o]ur Constitution is color-blind was most certainly justified in the context of his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896). 1(Parent Involved in Community Schools), limited the use of race in K-12 integration plans on Equal Protection grounds. Brief in Opposition in No. 05915, pp. The plurality is wrong to do so. Parents Involved in Cmty. In 1973 a federal court found that Jefferson County had maintained a segregated school system, Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Ed. 05908, pp. In 2007, the United States Supreme Court struck down two local school board initiatives meant to reverse extreme racial segregation in public schools. Id. Again, neither school board asserts that its race-based actions were taken to remedy prior discrimination. And statements of a legal rule set forth in a judicial opinion do not always divide neatly into holdings and dicta. (Consider the legal status of Justice Powells separate opinion in Regents of Univ. In 1963, the transfer programs first year, 239 black students and 8 white students transferred. of Ed., 72 F.Supp. 1986) (upholding rezoning plan under rational-basis review). And if Seattle School Dist. 6, 39 Ill. 2d 593, 237 N.E. 2d 498 (1968). 3, p.17 (The Court is dealing with thousands of local school districts and schools. The following notice, published in a Louisville newspaper in 1976, gives a sense of how the districts race-based busing plan operated in practice: Louisville Courier Journal, June 18, 1976 (reproduced in J. Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration 19541978, p. 176 (1979)). For example, the dissent features Tometz v. Board of Ed., Waukegan City School Dist. See Sheff v. ONeill, 238 Conn. 1, 678 A. [Footnote 9] We have made it unusually clear that strict scrutiny applies to every racial classification. They were further persuaded that these plans differed from other race-based programs this Court has considered because they are certainly more benign than laws that favor or disfavor one race, segregate by race, or create quotas for or against a racial group, Comfort, 418 F.3d, at 28 (Boudin, C.J., concurring), and they are far from the original evils at which the Fourteenth Amendment was addressed, id., at 29; 426 F.3d, at 1195 (Kozinski, J., concurring). If those students were considered for a whole range of their talents and school needs with race as just one consideration, Grutter would have some application. of Jefferson Cty., Nos. Similarly, between 1968 and 1980, the number of black children attending schools that were more than 90% minority fell from 64% to 33% in the Nation (from 78% to 23% in the South), but that too reversed direction, rising by the year 2000 from 33% to 37% in the Nation (from 23% to 31% in the South). We relied on the fact that the courts of last appeal of some sixteen or eighteen States have passed upon the validity of the separate but equal doctrine vis-a-vis the Fourteenth Amendment. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle (2007) In 2003, the Supreme Court ruled in Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger that race-based classifications, as used in affirmative-action policies, must be "narrowly tailored" to a "compelling government interest," like diversity. The next Term, we accordingly stated that full compliance with Brown I required school districts to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis. Brown II, 349 U. S., at 300301 (emphasis added). 26401 (1948). See, e.g., App. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. The reason is obvious: In Seattle, where the overall student population is 41% white, permitting 85% white enrollment at a single school would make it much more likely that other schools would have very few white students, whereas in Jefferson County, with a 60% white enrollment, one school with 85% white students would be less likely to skew enrollments elsewhere. Because this Court has authorized and required race-based remedial measures to address de jure segregation, it is important to define segregation clearly and to distinguish it from racial imbalance. 2d 158. As a matter of social experimentation, the laws in question must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution. 05915, at 82. Many parents, white and black alike, want their children to attend schools with children of different races. [Footnote 6] But without a history of state-enforced racial separation, a school district has no affirmative legal obligation to take race-based remedial measures to eliminate segregation and its vestiges. This working backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing precedent. 1 1996 Memorandum 14; Brief for Respondents in No. Yet the Seattle public schools have not shown that they were ever segregated by law, and were not subject to court-ordered desegregation decrees. local tax dollars will be spent. And what of the long history and moral vision that the Fourteenth Amendment itself embodies? in No. Read MoreParents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle . The Court need not resolve the parties dispute over whether racial diversity in schools has a marked impact on test scores and other objective yardsticks or achieves intangible socialization benefits because it is clear that the racial classifications at issue are not narrowly tailored to the asserted goal. For example, where does the dissents principle stop? See 448 U. S., at 539. 4. The context here is one of racial limits that seek, not to keep the races apart, but to bring them together. 1725, 2841. Finally, it argues that race-neutral techniques, such as a lottery or taking into account many forms of diversity in a holistic approach, would be as effective as the racial tiebreaker. 1 Hampton I, supra, at 757758, 762; Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Ed. 1 L. Kohn, Priority Shift: The Fate of Mandatory Busing for School Desegregation in Seattle and the Nation 2730, 32 (Mar. 05915, p. 48, but we are nonetheless obliged to ensure that it exists, Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 514 (2006). It reported that most districts92 of them, in factadopted desegregation policies that combined two or more highly race-conscious strategies, for example, rezoning or pairing. of Jefferson Cty., 489 F.2d 925, 932 (CA6), vacated and remanded, 418 U. S. 918, reinstated with modifications, 510 F.2d 1358, 1359 (CA6 1974), and in 1975 the District Court entered a desegregation decree. Justice Thomas also rejected the view advanced by the dissent that these school districts were in danger of resegregation. So long as the plan is narrowly tailored, meaning that it uses the least restrictive means to obtain the benefits that flow from diversity and implements a plan that does not result in an impermissible quota, school districts can have some say in the racial make-up of their student body. In doing so, it distorts precedent, it misapplies the relevant constitutional principles, it announces legal rules that will obstruct efforts by state and local governments to deal effectively with the growing resegregation of public schools, it threatens to substitute for present calm a disruptive round of race-related litigation, and it undermines Browns promise of integrated primary and secondary education that local communities have sought to make a reality. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). PICS cites Supreme Court jurisprudence for the proposition that there is no compelling government interest in adjusting general societal discrimination. Sustained resistance to Brown prompted the Court to authorize extraordinary race-conscious remedial measures (like compelled racial mixing) to turn the Constitutions dictate to desegregate into reality. [Footnote 16]. Cf. But what about Seattles? Brief for Respondents in No. Regardless of what Justice Breyers goals might be, this Court does not sit to create a society that includes all Americans or to solve the problems of troubled inner city schooling. Ibid. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958). The school districts have not carried their heavy burden of showing that the interest they seek to achieve justifies the extreme means they have chosendiscriminating among individual students based on race by relying upon racial classifications in making school assignments. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. By 1991, the board had concluded that assigning elementary school students to two or more schools during their elementary school years had proved educationally unsound and, if continued, would undermine Kentuckys newly adopted Education Reform Act. A. I dont have a definition for that); id., at 228a229a (I dont think weve ever sat down and said, Define racially concentrated school exactly on point in quantitative terms. I dont think weve ever had that conversation); Tr. The sample includes districts in urban areas of all sizes, suburbs (e.g., Arlington County, Virginia) and rural areas (e.g., Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, and Raleigh County, West Virginia). Justice Thomas concludes noting "If our history has taught us anything it has taught us to beware of elites bearing racial theories." See, e.g., Exec. Simply putting students together under the same roof does not necessarily mean that the students will learn together or even interact. 2738, 168 L.Ed.2d 508 (2007), United States Supreme Court, case facts, key issues, and holdings and reasonings online today. And in light of those challenges, they have asked us not to take from their hands the instruments they have used to rid their schools of racial segregation, instruments that they believe are needed to overcome the problems of cities divided by race and poverty. I use the words may need here deliberately. Moreover, the effect of applying race-conscious criteria here affects potentially disadvantaged students less severely, not more severely, than the criteria at issue in Grutter. 05908, at 30a. The Nations schools strive to teach that our strength comes from people of different races, creeds, and cultures uniting in commitment to the freedom of all. The respondents raised this issue in their brief opposing the grant of certiorari. Unlike the dissenters, I am unwilling to delegate my constitutional responsibilities to local school boards and allow them to experiment with race-based decisionmaking on the assumption that their intentions will forever remain as good as Justice Breyers. It is well established that when a governmental policy is subjected to strict scrutiny, the government has the burden of proving that racial classifications are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests. Johnson, supra, at 505 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 227 (1995)). Bd. Evidence from the Segregated Schooling of African American Children, in Beyond Desegregation 209226 (M. Shujaa ed. Other studies have found that both black and white students who attend integrated schools are more likely to work in desegregated companies after graduation than students who attended racially isolated schools. (authorizing aid to minority institutions). In doing so, it sought to deemphasize the use of racial criteria and to increase the likelihood that a student would receive an assignment at his first or second choice high school. It also contends that racial diversity is too amorphous and uncertain a concept to be considered a compelling interest, and finally disputes as inconclusive the Districts statistics regarding the increased success rates of students in integrated schools. When determining where to place a child or where to transfer a child both school districts use race as the qualifying factor on where to send the child. After the site was removed, the district offered the comforting clarification that the site was not intended to hold onto unsuccessful concepts such as melting pot or colorblind mentality. Ibid. Compare ante, at 29, with supra, at 69. In fact, six of the Seattle high schools involved in this case were built by the 1920s; the other four were open by the early 1960s. See also ante, at 1517 (Thomas, J., concurring). It applied that label to 26 schools, including 4 high schoolsCleveland (72.8% minority), Franklin (76.6% minority), Garfield (78.4% minority), and Rainier Beach (58.9% minority). 05908. 05908, at 910, 47; App. No. 1", "Guidance ESE from Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights Russlynn Ali and United States Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Perez", "McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools & Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. The history of the plans before us, their educational importance, their highly limited use of raceall these and moremake clear that the compelling interest here is stronger than in Grutter. 2841. To show that the school assignment plans here meet the requirements of the Constitution, I have written at exceptional length. When the government classifies an individual by race, it must first define what it means to be of a race. Under no fair reading, though, can the majority opinion in Gratz be cited as authority to sustain the racial classifications under consideration here. See also, e.g., Crawford v. Board of Ed. The practice can lead to corrosive discourse, where race serves not as an element of our diverse heritage but instead as a bargaining chip in the political process. 1, 458 U. S., at 472473. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U. S. ___, ___ (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that two were killed and hundreds were injured in race rioting subsequent to this Courts decision in Johnson). [4] However, the Court struck down both school districts' assignment plans, finding that the plans were not sufficiently "narrowly tailored", a legal term that suggests that the means or method being employed (in this case, a student assignment plan based on individualized racial classifications) is closely and narrowly tied to the ends (the stated goals of achieving diversity and/or avoiding racial isolation). '"[17], Part III B[14] (joined only by a plurality of the Court) rejected the notion that racial balancing could be a compelling state interest, as to do so "would justify the imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary to our repeated recognition that "[a]t the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class. See also Bakke, 438 U. S., at 289291 (opinion of Powell, J.) Our ruling on the merits simply stated that the appeal was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. School Comm. Rather, such powers should have been temporary and used only to overcome the widespread resistance to the dictates of the Constitution. 515 U. S., at 125 (Thomas, J., concurring). Compare ante, at 39 (It was not the inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children on the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional violation in 1954), with Juris. The U.S. Constitution in Article III 2 specifies the scope of matters on which the federal courts can issue decisions. 05908, at 162a. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. The dissent thus alters in fundamental ways not only the facts presented here but the established law. And the fact that the state and local governments had relied on statements in this Courts opinions was irrelevant to the Brown Court. The Court quoted the articulation of diversity from Justice Powells opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978), noting that it is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, that can justify the use of race. Grutter, supra, at 324325 (citing and quoting Bakke, supra, at 314315 (opinion of Powell, J. Here Roberts provides the following string citation: Here, Roberts provides the following string cite: Id., at 337, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 156 L. Ed. In both cities plaintiffs filed lawsuits claiming unconstitutional segregation. And the Court, using the very phrase that Justice Marshall had used to describe strict scrutinys application to any exclusionary use of racial criteria, sought to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is as likely to condemn inclusive uses of race-conscious criteria as it is to invalidate exclusionary uses. Indeed in Louisville itself the achievement gap between black and white elementary school students grew substantially smaller (by seven percentage points) after the integration plan was implemented in 1975. ; see also post, at 61. in No. [Footnote 22] The dissent argues that todays decision threatens to substitute for present calm a disruptive round of race-related litigation, post, at 2, and claims that todays decision risks serious harm to the law and for the Nation, post, at 65. The plans under reviewwhich are less burdensome, more egalitarian, and more effective than prior planscontinue in that tradition. Since Grutter explicitly stated that seeking to maintain a specific percentage of minority students in the student body was patently unconstitutional, PICS contends that the Districts plan is also ipso facto unconstitutional. of Ed., 395 U. S. 225, 232 (1969) (approving a lower court desegregation order that provided that the [school] board must move toward a goal under which in each school the ratio of white to Negro faculty members is substantially the same as it is throughout the system, and immediately requiring [t]he ratio of Negro to white teachers in each school to be equal to the ratio of Negro to white teachers in the system as a whole). This plan is in place as of 2017. 05915, at 97. In 1963, at the insistence of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other community groups, the school board adopted a new race-based transfer policy. For instance, students who attend Franklin and Ballard will receive metro passes rather than bus service. 2, p.7 (Local self-government in local affairs is essential to the peace and happiness of each locality and to the strength and stability of our whole federal system. Asian, Hispanic, White, etc. See also Freeman, supra, at 495496; Dowell, 498 U. S., at 248; Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 746 (1974). in No. And federal courts would rightly hesitate to find unitary status if the consequences of the ruling were so dramatically disruptive. Moreover, these cases are not governed by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 328, in which the Court held that, for strict scrutiny purposes, a government interest in student body diversity in the context of higher education is compelling. The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, IIIA, and IIIC, concluding: 1.